What is the self that experiences all of this? Some traditions treat it as an eternal soul, others as a temporary bundle of processes, and others locate it primarily in relationship and community rather than as an isolated inner entity at all.
Views on the self range from something eternal and God-given to something that may not exist as a fixed thing at all. Christianity and Islam both affirm a soul distinct from the body, though Islam's concept of the nafs treats the self as more dynamically contested. Judaism tends toward a more integrated, embodied view of personhood. Buddhism's doctrine of non-self is the most radical departure here, treating the intuitive sense of 'I' as constructed rather than fundamental. Stoicism identifies the self specifically with rational judgment, distinct from body or circumstance.
Most traditions hold that humans possess an immortal soul, distinct from the body, created by God and bearing the 'image of God' (imago Dei), though the exact relationship between soul and body is debated across denominations.
Scholars often note this grounds human dignity and moral status in something metaphysically distinct from the physical body, with significant downstream implications for ethics.
The doctrine of anatta (non-self) holds that there is no permanent, unchanging self or soul — what we call 'self' is a continuously changing process of physical and mental phenomena (the five aggregates).
This is often characterized by scholars as one of the more radical claims among major traditions: the intuitive sense of a stable 'I' is treated as a cognitive construction, not a metaphysical fact.
Humans are understood to possess a soul (ruh) breathed into them by God, along with a nafs (self/ego) that can be inclined toward good or evil depending on spiritual discipline.
Scholars frequently note the nafs framework treats the self as something dynamic and morally contestable, rather than fixed — a site of ongoing spiritual struggle.
The nature of the soul (neshamah) is discussed with considerable variation, from the Hebrew Bible's relatively holistic view of the person to later Kabbalistic frameworks describing multiple layers of the soul.
Many scholars point out that Jewish thought historically emphasizes the person as an embodied, integrated whole, in contrast to sharper body-soul dualism found elsewhere.
The self is identified primarily with the rational, governing faculty of the mind (hegemonikon) — the capacity for judgment and choice — rather than with the body or external circumstances.
This is often read by scholars as an early form of locating personal identity specifically in rational agency, prefiguring later philosophical treatments of the self.
The atman (individual self/soul) is held by many schools to be eternal and, in non-dualist traditions like Advaita Vedanta, ultimately identical to Brahman, the universal ground of reality; dualist schools (like Dvaita) instead hold the self remains eternally distinct from, though related to, the divine.
Scholars often highlight this monist-versus-dualist split as one of the most significant unresolved philosophical debates within Hinduism itself, rather than a settled tradition-wide position.
The self is understood primarily in relational terms — substantially constituted by one's roles and relationships (ruler-subject, parent-child, elder-younger, and so on) — with self-cultivation (xiushen) treated as the central lifelong practice of becoming a fully realized person.
Scholars often contrast this relational conception of self sharply with more individualistic frameworks that treat the self as a bounded, independent entity prior to its relationships.
The soul is understood as a spark of the divine, temporarily separated from Waheguru by ego and illusion (maya); spiritual practice is aimed at dissolving that ego so the soul can recognize its true, God-connected nature.
Scholars often note this positions the self as fundamentally divine in origin, with ego treated as an obscuring layer rather than the self's true nature.
The self is understood as inseparable from the natural world and the Tao, rather than as a bounded, independent entity; rigid notions of a fixed self are often treated as an obstacle to living in harmony with the Tao.
Scholars frequently compare this fluid conception of self to Buddhist non-self, while noting Taoism frames it through nature and cosmic flow rather than through analysis of mental processes.
Every living being is held to possess an eternal, individual soul (jiva) that is inherently omniscient and blissful, though this true nature is obscured by accumulated karmic matter; liberation reveals the soul's original, unclouded nature.
Scholars often contrast this with Buddhist non-self: Jainism affirms a real, eternal individual soul, differing sharply from Buddhism despite both traditions sharing a karma-and-liberation framework.
There is no single systematic doctrine of the self; personhood is generally understood in relation to kami, ancestry, and community, with less emphasis on articulating an inner metaphysical self than in many other traditions.
Scholars often note this reflects Shinto's broader character as a practice-centered tradition, with communal ritual and relationship emphasized over abstract metaphysical claims about consciousness.